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By “naturalists” I mean philosophers who think that what there is and what we know
are questions reliably answered by the methods of the empirical sciences; “speculative
naturalists” (cf. Leiter 2015: 4-9), like Hume and Nietzsche, are philosophers who think that we
can try to answer those questions by extending existing scientific explanatory paradigms to
questions of philosophical interest that the sciences have not gotten around to addressing.
Some professed naturalists, Quine most notoriously, are better in theory than practice: for
Quine maintained allegiance to an ontology (physicalism) and a psychology (behaviorism)
decades after both were discredited as a matter of actual scientific practice. (Quine, sadly,
never got much past the science of the 1930s and 1940s.) Ironically, speculative naturalists like
Hume and Nietzsche often do better: they extended their ontology to include the nonreducible mental states necessary to make causal sense of human phenomena long before the
general cognitive revolution in psychology. And Nietzsche does better than Hume: first,
because he extends psychological causes to the unconscious, and second, because he does not
assume that the most plausible psychology will vindicate prevailing moral opinions.
“Normativity” picks out a number of philosophical problems, but I take the central one
posed for naturalists to be this: what is a naturalist to say about ubiquitous normative claims
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like, “You ought to believe in the theory of evolution given the evidence,” or “You ought not eat
beef given the cruelty of factory farming of cows.” These normative claims are in the deontic
mode, but they need not be: one can just as well ask what naturalists should say about
normative claims like, “You’re a damn fool if you don’t believe in the theory of evolution,” and
“You’re a moral reprobate if you still eat beef given all we know about factory farming.” How
do we locate claims about what you ought to believe or what you ought to do, or about which
claims deserve credence or about what your moral worth is given your conduct in a world
conceived naturalistically? Following Finlay (2010: 334) among many others, we will say that
the central problem is about understanding the property of being a reason, whether for action
or belief (cf. Scanlon 2014: 1-2 for a similar view). It is important to emphasize at the start that
the problem for naturalists is not simply about moral or practical normativity, but about
normativity tout court. Reasons for belief are normative too, and it was the primary mistake of
20th-century naturalists and moral skeptics like A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson to ignore the
epistemic case—a mistake that can be remediated, I will suggest, in what follows.
Why are these kinds of normativity a problem for the naturalist? The central worry, I
take it, is that the explanatory modalities of the empirical sciences do not make any reference
to deontic or normative properties related to reasons, as distinct from nomic or descriptive
ones. Naturalistic explanations operate in the idiom of causes, not norms, and casual mention
of norms in such explanations are always shorthand for causal explanations that are norm-free:
e.g., “Oedipus gouged out his eyes when he discovered the wrongful things he had done,” is
really shorthand for, “Oedipus gouged out his eyes when he came to believe he had married his
mother and killed his father, because he felt these actions were shameful.” An adequate
2
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naturalistic explanation does not depend on it being a fact (or true) that it was wrongful to
murder one’s father and marry one’s mother; it does not depend on it being a fact (or true) that
one has a reason not to murder one’s father or marry one’s mother (see Leiter 2001). An
adequate naturalistic explanation depends only on facts about the psychological states in which
Oedipus found himself and the facts about human behavior in the world; it might also depend
on psycho-social or anthropological facts about the belief and attitudes of others in the relevant
community in which Oedpius lived. But what it does not depend on is that it is shameful,
independent of how Oedipus or his compatriots feel, to marry your mother and kill your father,
or that it is wrongful, independent of how Oedipus and others feel, to marry your mother and
kill your father.
Why then is normativity a puzzle for the naturalist? It seems the naturalist has a
straightforward account of normativity: what we call normativity is simply an artifact of the
psychological properties of certain biological organisms, i.e., what they feel or believe or desire
(or are disposed to feel, believe, or desire). As long as the posited organisms are naturalistically
respectable, and the mental states invoked are as well, then that is the end of the naturalist’s
story. What’s all the fuss?
One kind of philosophical fuss pertains to the semantics, to how we are to understand
the meaning of the normative talk in the naturalist’s world. I do not plan to discuss that at
length here, since I think it represents a wrong turn in philosophical discussion of normativity.
Naturalists have usually (John Mackie is the most famous exception) opted for non-cognitivist
interpretations of the semantics, and this has led them into the abyss of the Frege-Geach
problem, the problem of how to explain the truth-preserving properties of inferences involving
3
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moral propositions embedded in the antecedents of conditionals (e.g., “If stealing is wrong,
then it is wrong to encourage John to steal”; but “stealing is wrong”; so “it is wrong to
encourage John to steal”). My view is that we should not let our metaphysics—our most
plausible account of what really exists—be driven by linguistic practices: why let the semantic
tail wag the metaphysical dog? As Crispin Wright observed a quarter-century ago, if
metaphysical anti-realism about moral facts conjoined with non-cognitivism about the
semantics of moral judgments had “absolutely no prospect of a satisfactory construal of
conditionals with moral antecedents that could hardly be decisive. Rather, whatever case there
was for [this kind of anti-realist view] would become potentially revisionary of our ordinary and
moral linguistic practice….” (Wright 1988: 31). But we don’t even have to “bite the bullet” on
such “radical revisionism” (as Wright aptly calls it), when there remain other options on the
semantic front: first, there are highly technical non-cognitivist solutions to the Frege-Geach
challenge, like Gibbard’s; second, we can adopt a minimalist approach to truth, such that the
propriety and intelligibility of certain assetoric idioms in evaluative language is enough to
warrant cognitivism, with the issue between moral realists and anti-realists located elsewhere
(for example, in the conception of objectivity [cf. Wright 1992]); and third, we can simply
eschew the representationalist framework for understanding language, opting for inferential
views which take seriously that “meaning is use,” and thus are quite compatible with a
naturalistic metaphysics in which normativity does not exist.
Putting the semantics to one side, I want to focus on an interlocking set of metaphysical,
epistemological, and, for want of a better word, practical or first-personal worries about
normativity for naturalists. We may summarize them as follows. First, naturalism is self4

refuting, since the naturalistic outlook itself presupposes epistemic norms whose status is not
naturalistically vindicated. Second, naturalism imposes domain-specific standards on domains
of thought where they do not belong. Third, naturalism fails to do justice to the real, practical
nature of normativity: it can explain what we call normativity, but it can not explain real
normativity.1 I shall take these up in turn.
Naturalism is self-refuting
The naturalist supposes that we should treat the methods and thus the results of the
empirical sciences as arbiters of what is true and what is knowable. But why do so unless those
methods and results are themselves normatively sound, that is, justified by epistemically
relevant considerations? Yet we may then ask: are those “epistemically relevant
considerations” themselves to be interpreted as results of the empirical sciences? Clearly not,
on pain of circularity, but even apart from worries about circularity, it is not at all clear that
these norms constitute scientific results as opposed to being presuppositions of scientific
method. So that means the naturalist commends epistemic norms that are, themselves, not
vindicated naturalistically: hence self-refutation.
This objection would be correct if the defense of naturalism were that epistemic norms
favored it. But this is not and can not be the defense of naturalism. Quine, the leading
Anglophone naturalist, was not ideally clear on this issue, sometimes being rather glib about
the circularity problem, but I take it the right response to the worry is apparent in the famous
closing observations in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”:

1

I take it that “real normativity” means standards of what one ought to do or believe that are not
dependent for their binding force on the attitudes, feelings, or beliefs of persons.
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As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool,
ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical
objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries -- not
by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable,
epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay
physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a
scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical
objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter
our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically
superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for
working a manageable structure into the flux of experience. (1951: 41)
The interest in predicting the future course of experience is, to put it mildly, a widely shared
interest, one that facilitates crossing the street, eating a meal, and living a life. On this kind of
view, we should be naturalists because naturalism works, not because it is “true” or “justified”
in some sense either independent of or dependent upon naturalistic criteria. “Naturalism
works” may sound like a slogan, but it is a slogan with real significance. Consider: thanks to the
warranted beliefs of aerospace engineers (and, behind them, physicists and chemists), the
plane that brought me here actually brought me here, that is, several tons of metal tubing and
associated electronics rose tens of thousands of feet into the sky, with me strapped inside, and
moved faster than any natural thing can on the ground, and deposited me in the place I was
aiming to go—and not in the middle of the ocean or the middle of a desert—and did this
without incinerating, mutilating, or otherwise killing me. Imagine telling a Homeric era farmer
6

that, “In the future, farmers like you will be able to travel through the clouds in special tubes to
far away places you have heard of in stories, and do that in the time it takes you to ride a horse
to the neighboring village.” To be sure, the ontology of Homeric gods licenses telling stories
about such magic, but the ontology of aerospace engineers allows the farmers and the
professors to actually experience it. That airplanes work is not an epistemic warrant, but that
airplanes work gives us the pragmatic explanation why creatures like us are disposed to treat
the epistemology that underlies aerospace engineering as the benchmark of the true and the
knowable. The reasons for being a naturalist in the first place are not question-beggingly
epistemic reasons; they are pragmatic ones, that almost everyone—including the antinaturalists—actually accept in practice.2 Naturalism thus makes its claim on us in virtue of its
resonance with our attitudes, our practical interests in coping with the future course of our
experience in the world.3
Notice that the locution “reasons for being a naturalist” really means “what explains
why creatures like us are affectively disposed to take naturalistic epistemic criteria seriously.”
Someone could “reasonably” reject these reasons; but “reasonably” is, itself, a pro-attitude
2
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3
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for example, fictionalist naturalism—act as if we believe, rather than actually believe, whatever best explains our
experience—would be just as good as actual naturalism? The only colorable answer is that it would not be:
maintaining a make-believe posture is much harder than believing, which is why make-believe occupies so little of
our lives. Skepticism about “naturalism works” usually trades, I suspect, on understating how well a naturalistic
view really works in both ordinary and theoretical life.
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term of endorsement, meaning only that someone could feel indifferent to epistemic norms
that, when applied, produce certain outcomes—outcomes like planes taking off and landing
where they are supposed to. That epistemology bottoms out in practical interests should
hardly be a surprising conclusion for a naturalist. Let us recall two important lessons from
naturalistically-minded 20th-century philosophy. First, from the famous Duhem-Quine thesis
(Duhem 1914, Quine 1975, 1990) about the under-determination of scientific theories by
evidence, we know that there are not even any scientific hypotheses that are epistemically
obligatory, in the sense of required by logic and evidence.4 This is because any recalcitrant
evidence elicited in a test of an hypothesis is compatible with the hypothesis as long as we are
willing to give up the background assumptions such a test requires. In choosing among
competing hypotheses and background assumptions, we must always fall back on evaluative
considerations that “nature” does not adjudicate among, considerations such as theoretical
simplicity, methodological conservatism, and consilience (cf. Quine & Ullian 1978).5 Second,
unless there were a plausible substantive conception of rationality (there does not appear to be
one, alas), then rationality, including any internalist norm of epistemic warrant, is itself
instrumental, imposing normative constraints only on the means chosen to realize our ends,
whatever they may happen to be. Thus, even norms for belief are hostage to ultimate ends,
and so particular beliefs are unwarranted (that is, irrational) only relative to the believer’s ends,
a point Peter Railton pressed twenty years ago against those who thought there was a firm
4

I acknowledge that the inveterate dogmatic realist may think this is merely an epistemic point, not a
metaphysical one: there could still be real epistemic values; after all, we just do not know what they are or how to
apply them. That is a logically possible position, but I am with Quine in thinking that if the actual successful
sciences do not disclose such epistemic values, then it is dubious that reality demands any particular set of them.
5
Scientific theories are none the worse for the naturalist in depending on logic, evidence and nonepistemic evaluative considerations: if the resulting theories work well for creatures like us, what more is there to
expect?
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fact/value distinction (see Railton 1986). That conclusion would also hardly be surprising to a
naturalist like Nietzsche, who clearly appreciated the extent to which theoretical questions
were driven by practical ends and interests (BGE 3-9).
Naturalism is, then, not self-refuting, since what commends naturalistic norms is not
their warrant but their resonance with our practical interests and attitudes.
Naturalism imposes domain-specific standards where they do not belong
Someone who acknowledged the resonance of naturalistic epistemic norms with our
practical attitudes might nonetheless object that such norms, while great for air travel and
crossing the street, do not really help when it comes to coping with the prospect of death and
suffering, or figuring out how to treat their neighbors. Why think naturalistic norms for belief
should dominate the epistemic field, especially since, as we have just conceded, naturalism is
not epistemically or, more broadly, rationally obligatory? Why think it should govern our talk
and thought about norms outside the domain of phenomena for which we seek causal
explanations? Maybe naturalistic norms “work” in certain domains, and that’s enough; but why
treat them as binding in other domains? That is the objection I wish to consider now.
The late Ronald Dworkin posed an extreme version of this challenge in 1996, but since
then it has been taken up by his friends, including Thomas Nagel (1997), Derek Parfit (2011),
and T.M. Scanlon (2014) (cf. McGrath 2014). The core thought that animates the antinaturalists is this: even if causal or explanatory power is the criterion of the real and the
knowable in the domain of the natural sciences, there is no reason to treat it as the arbiter of
the real and the knowable in other domains of thought and inquiry. Call this view Domain
Separatism. Domain Separatists hold that metaphysical and epistemological criteria vary with
9

the subject-matter of cognitive domains and that it is an error to impose naturalistic criteria,
appropriate, for example, in natural scientific inquiries, on to other domains. Domain
Separatists thus endorse a version of the doctrine of “separate but equal”: separate
metaphysical and epistemic criteria for each domain, but all the domains are equal in terms of
cognitive status, that is, stating truths and generating knowledge.
The crucial question, obviously enough, is how we demarcate domains as the Domain
Separatist would have us do? Dworkin says that while causal explanatory power "does seem
appropriate to beliefs about the physical world" (1996: 119), it makes no sense for moral beliefs
"[s]ince morality and the other evaluative domains make no causal claims" (1996: 120). But
that is plainly false: the moral explanations literature from the 1980s onwards—recall Brink,
Railton, Sayre-McCord, Sturgeon, and others—is replete with examples of the role of causal
claims in ordinary normative discourse (e.g., "Of course he betrayed them, he's an evil person").
It is perfectly reasonable then, even on the terms established by normative discourse itself, to
inquire whether these explanations are good ones, let alone best explanations for the
phenomena in question (see Leiter 2001b for a negative answer to this question).
Scanlon’s recent view is more nuanced than Dworkin’s (cf. 2014: 21-22). Scanlon allows
that there are “mixed” normative claims, ones that involve or presuppose claims about natural
facts (and presumably could involve or presuppose causal claims in particular). But at the same
time he affirms the core of Domain Separatism, namely, that it “makes most sense” he says to
“not privilege science” but instead to endorse a view that,
takes as basic a range of domains, including mathematics, science, and moral and
practical reasoning. It holds that statements within all of these domains are capable of
10

truth and falsity, and that the truth values of statements about one domain, insofar as
they do not conflict with statements of some other domain, are properly settled by the
standards of the domain that they are about. (2014: 19)
I note in passing that Scanlon gives no real argument for demarcating domains other than
saying he thinks it “makes most sense”6 to think of things his way. This betrays, I think, a deep
peculiarity of much philosophy, including most Anglophone philosophy of the past half-century,
namely, that it treats subjective reports of what “makes most sense” as data points with
epistemic weight, as opposed to psycho-social artifacts that admit of explanation. But I will
bracket that skeptical doubt here, even though a thorough-going naturalist should not: the
psychology and sociology of inquirers, especially in a field as devoid of clear cognitive standards
as philosophy, is an apt topic for systematic empirical investigation.
But back to Scanlon’s version of Domain Separatism. Prior to saying it “makes most
sense” to demarcate domains, Scanlon does note one consideration that might favor Domain
Separatism, namely, the difficulties naturalists like Quine have in accounting for certain abstract
mathematical truths, ones that do not seem indispensable for our best scientific theories. The
latter kinds of abstract mathematical truths are worrisome for precisely the reason that Domain
Separatists like Dworkin and Scanlon hope to invoke against the naturalist in the moral or
practical case: namely, that it seems there are clear truths in this domain, which we should be
loathe to give up. If the Quinean naturalist can not capture all the abstract truths of
mathematics with his causal/explanatory criterion for the real and the knowable, then so much
the worse for the Quinean, so the Domain Separatist suggests.
6

Later, Scanlon says the idea of “domains” is just “common sense” (2014: 23), but that common sense
embraces falsehoods is, from my philosophical standpoint, neither probative nor surprising.
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That intuition is prima facie plausible in the mathematical case, but precisely for the
reasons it is dubious in the moral case, a point that requires emphasis. Remember: the fact
that there is massive cross-cultural and cross-temporal convergence on mathematical truths
among inquirers, a kind of convergence that seems hard to explain away sociologically or
psychologically, is precisely what makes it tempting to reject any metaphysical or
epistemological criteria that made the convergence inexplicable on epistemic grounds, that is,
as manifesting sensitivity to the mathematical truths in question. (In fact, convergence, like
divergence, demands an explanation, and truth is not the only candidate even in cases of
convergence, but we may bracket that here.) Importantly, nothing comparable is true in the
moral case: we do not even have the requisite convergence in moral opinions that might create
a defeasible presumption in favor of truth. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, drawing on
Nietzsche, the most striking fact about inquirers in the moral domain is that they agree about
almost nothing, not about the priority of the right versus the good, or about the criterion of
right action, or the criterion of goodness, or about whether the right and the good are even the
fundamental ethical categories (Leiter 2014). Massive failure of convergence in the ethical
domain ought to worry the moral realist.7 Scanlon is certainly sensitive to this concern and so
appeals to such purportedly uncontroversial truths about practical reason like, “The fact that a
person’s child has died is a reason for that person to feel sad” (2014: 2), which is, unfortunately
for Scanlon, almost precisely the thesis that the Stoics quite intelligibly denied.8 We should
allow, however, that there might well be some odd practical claims that strike most creatures

7

It worries Parfit, of course, in On What Matters, and he tries to argue that, in fact, all major theories
converge. For some doubts, see Blackburn (2011) and Sandis (2011).
8
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations. Book 3 ch. XIV. (Thanks to Martha Nussbaum for this reference.)
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like us as correct—e.g., don’t torture babies for fun—but such irrelevant outliers do not come
close to the enormous cross-cultural convergence in the mathematical case.
So how, then, do we ultimately demarcate domains on Scanlon’s view? Scanlon makes
a variety of comments regarding how to think of “domains”—for example, that a domain
should be “understood in terms of concepts that it deals with, such as number, set, physical
object, reason, or morally right action” (2014: 19)—and he even purports to allow that “there
can be meaningful ‘external’ questions about the adequacy of reasoning in a domain” (2014:
21). In the end, though, Scanlon echoes Dworkin in his own discussion of Gilbert Harman’s
“best explanation” argument for moral anti-realism (Harman 1977). Harman, recall, argued
that since the best explanation of why we might judge it wrongful for a bunch of young
hoodlums to douse a cat with lighter fluid and set it aflame need make no reference to it
actually being wrong to do so, only to facts about our psychology and our socialization, that we,
therefore, have no reason to think it is really or objectively wrongful. Against Harman’s view,
Scanlon writes:
[T]here is no reason to accept Harman’s [best explanation] requirement as he
formulated it—as a perfectly general requirement applying to all domains—since they
do not all aim at the same kinds of understanding (e.g., at the best causal explanations
of the world that impinges on our sensory surfaces). (2014: 27)
We may grant that moral talk and “understanding,” assuming there is such a thing, does not
aim primarily at causal explanation, even if, as we remarked earlier, moral talk sometimes helps
itself to causal explanations—but Scanlon is more cautious than Dworkin, since he does not
deny outright the relevance of causal explanation to moral thought, only that moral thought
13

has other primary aims. But does it follow from this concession that there really is, as Scanlon
claims, no reason to accept causal explanatory power as a marker of the real and the knowable
even in the moral domain? That strong claim seems to overstate the case. Causal explanatory
power has exercised pressure on attempts to make sense of the world precisely because, since
the scientific revolution, our understanding of the world was purged of non-material causes,
and teleologies, and gods and ghosts, because such entities have no causal explanatory power.
We seem to know and understand more, as a result of this epistemically motivated cleansing.
Why not say, then, that all domains that aim at understanding have a reason to take seriously
the most successful markers of actual understanding we have? Indeed, the history of human
inquiry since the scientific revolution is the history of purportedly domain-specific reasoning
being subjected to scrutiny from scientific domains whose concepts and ontologies seemed to
warrant more epistemic credence. Perhaps there is only one domain, the domain of human
attempts to make sense of the world in all its baroque complexities, and to do so in terms that
warrant some degree of epistemic confidence?
We may put the challenge to the Domain Separatist more precisely. Domain Separatists
maintain that metaphysical and epistemological criteria vary with the subject-matter of
purportedly “cognitive” domains and that it is an error to impose naturalistic criteria,
appropriate, for example, in natural scientific inquiries, on to other domains. But in what
domain do we locate the Domain Separatist thesis itself? What domain determines that a
particular domain is, in fact, “cognitive”? By what domain’s criteria is it supposed to be an error
to ask whether practical reasoning satisfies naturalistic criteria? I suppose it will be tempting to
say at this point that these claims are located in the domain of philosophy, that it falls to
14

something called “philosophical reasoning” to adjudicate overreaching by one domain against
another. But naturalists deny that there is something called “philosophical reasoning” that
stands apart from the kinds of reasoning that work in the various sciences, so that response
either begs the question against the naturalist or amounts to an admission that there is a metadomain of reasoning, something the naturalist accepts, and which is precisely what the
naturalist relies on in adjudicating the metaphysical and epistemological bona fides of all other
domains. Either way, it seems, the Domain Separatist loses.
Or does she? Even if the Domain Separatist eschews the question-begging response of
invoking the non-naturalist philosophical domain as the one that adjudicates the boundaries
between domains, she can still ask the naturalist: why think the meta-domain of reasoning
about which domains are cognitive should be governed by naturalistic standards of reasoning?
That question is especially pressing because naturalistic standards of reasoning are, as I have
already conceded, not rationally obligatory, but commended, instead, by our practical attitudes
and interests.
Here I think there is no better answer to the Domain Separatist than the fact that the
deliverances of naturalistic norms generally work well for creatures like us. No one finds it
surprising, after all, that if we relax naturalistic constraints, we will get a promiscuous ontology,
replete with moral facts, spirit facts, gustatory facts, aesthetic facts, theological facts, and so
on. Someone might, of course, prefer more moral, spirit, and gustatory facts, and the like, in
their ontology, but that is not, by itself, an argument against naturalism, unless one thinks the
epistemic norms that license belief in such facts answer to equally or more important practical
attitudes of creatures like us. The naturalist, to be sure, noting the extent to which all of us are
15

invested in naturalistic norms because they work so well in coping with the future course of
experience, might then point out the pressures created by consistency--though that, too, is an
epistemic attitude that is also not epistemically obligatory. And consistency in application of
epistemic norms across domains might well yield in the face of the practical need for certain
kinds of facts, such as facts about reasons. This brings us to what, I take it, has to be the real
objection to the naturalist about normativity: namely, that he has not explained real
normativity—that is, the bindingness of standards independent of our attitudes— and that
explaining the real normativity of reasons is indispensable for creatures like us when we are
trying to figure out what to do (or believe).
The naturalist has not explained “real” normativity
Perhaps the naturalist can explain our normative talk and judgments in terms of certain
psychological states of inclination and aversion, and complicated variations on those, but that
does not explain normativity, since it does not explain why it is actually wrong to do X or why
there is an overriding reason to do Y. Explaining the existence of normative talk in terms of
normative attitudes is not the same as explaining normativity, and the former is all my
naturalist has offered.
On this issue, I want to begin by noting my agreement with the anti-naturalists and my
disagreement with certain kinds of contemporary Humean naturalists. For many contemporary
Humean naturalists think they can give a naturalistic account of “real” normativity in terms of
psychological states like desire and thus deflect the anti-naturalist’s worry about the status of
real normativity. But here I think an arch anti-naturalist like Scanlon gets it exactly right: there
is, he says, an “evident lack of intrinsic normative significance of facts about desires” (2014: 6):
16

the significance of desire is, as Scanlon says, merely causal. Here is how Scanlon puts it at
greater length:
The question [for the Humean]…would be whether identifying facts about reason with
non-normative facts would explain reasons or eliminate their normativity. The ‘action
guiding’ force of reasons, on such a theory, would seem to be purely causal and
explanatory. If the fact that one has a strong reason to do a (and no countervailing
reason to do a) is just a natural fact about what will satisfy one’s desires, then this fact
might explain one’s failure to do a. But it does not explain why believing that one has
such a reason (believing that this natural fact obtains) can make it irrational for one to
do a. (2014: 6)
The problem is that the claim that it is “irrational for one to do a” means, for the naturalist,
nothing more than some people or even all people might feel that you should not do a. The
failed NeoHumean response to the problem of normativity underlines what it means to really
be a naturalist about normativity. Of course, the NeoHumean naturalist has not explained real
normativity, as Scanlon complains, because real normativity does not exist: that is the entire
upshot of the naturalist view. There are no reasons whose existence and character is
independent of human attitudes; there are only human attitudes which lead us to “talk the
talk” of reasons. And if real normativity does not exist, if only feelings of inclination and
aversion, compulsion and avoidance, actually exist, then that means that all purportedly
normative disputes bottom out not in reasons but in the clash of will or affect. That is why, as
A.J. Ayer correctly observed some eighty years ago, “when we come to deal with pure
questions of value, as distinct from questions of fact…we finally resort to mere abuse” (1936:
17

147). Rhetorically, abuse has many uses, but its predominant role in moral discourse, including
among philosophers,9 should be a red flag that we are far removed from the fabled “space of
reasons” in this arena.
Now what about the person deciding what she ought to do? If the naturalist is right,
how does it help her? The answer has to be that that it does not. The naturalist about
normativity gives us a third-person account of what normativity is, namely, certain kinds of
psychological states that grip certain kinds of biological organisms, and move them to action or
inaction. From the standpoint of the person thinking about what she ought to do, all this is
irrelevant. She will act on the feelings of inclination and aversion she has, subject to the
constraints they impose upon her beliefs about what is the case. In thinking about whether she
should act upon any particular inclination or aversion, she will be influenced by her other
inclinations and aversions, including the inclinations and aversions common in her community.
The only so-called “normative guidance” that could follow from these facts would be the
guidance that follows from a plausible psycho-social account of the relevant attitudes—which

9

Anscombe is notorious in this regard. See her two-sentence paper in Analysis: “The nerve of Mr.
Bennett’s argument is that if A results from your not doing B, then A results from whatever you do instead of B.
While there may be much to be said for this view, still it does not seem right on the face of it.” (Anscombe 1966)
Anscombe does not always treat her interlocutors as generously as she does Bennett: “But if someone really
thinks, in advance, that it is open to question such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent
should be quite excluded from consideration—I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.”
(Anscombe 1958: 17). Among consequentialists too, rhetorical abuse sometimes presents itself as an offer to selfapprobation. Consider Smart: “Or would you, as a humane and sympathetic person, give a preference to the
second universe? I myself cannot help feeling a preference for the second universe. But if someone feels the other
way I do not know how to argue with him.” (1973: 28) Consider also Wolf’s use of “scare-adjectives” (remarked
upon by Sommers 2007: 327): “A world in which human relationships are restricted to those that can be formed
and supported in the absence of the reactive attitudes is a world of human isolation so cold and dreary that any
but the most cynical must shudder at the idea of it.” (Wolf 1981: 391) Della Rocca’s epigraph to “The Taming of
Philosophy,” is here apt: “Don’t mistake the fact that you don’t like my view for an argument against it.”(Della
Rocca 2013: 178).
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itself she might, of course, repudiate, unless she has, like most people, a strong inclination not
to deviate too far from approved behavior in her locale.
Those who think practical philosophy is a cognitive subject—as opposed to what it
actually is, namely, a kind of armchair sociology of the moral etiquette of bourgeois philosophy
professors—typically object to the naturalist at this point by noting that an agent faces
comparable questions of theoretical normativity, questions about what she ought to believe.10
Here I differ from 20th-century naturalists and moral skeptics like Ayer and Stevenson, who
ignored this problem, and agree with naturalists and moral skeptics like Nietzsche, who did not:
I think the issue is the same (cf. Leiter 2013). Even in the theoretical domain, there is no real
normativity, that is, no norms of belief or epistemic value the agent must adhere to, as I argued
earlier. If epistemology proper, the systematic account of what one “ought” to believe, gives
the appearance of a more robust discipline it is only because its primary data points—namely,
the claims of the successful empirical sciences—are clearer and more widely accepted,
precisely because of their resonance with our practical interests. But that also means that
epistemology proper is also a kind of armchair sociology, though one that can be discharged
more responsibly from the armchair since its data points—the epistemic norms manifest in the
practices of the successful sciences—are ones that can be studied in illuminating ways by
reading books and journals.

10

See, for example, Korsgaard’s (2012) 3AM interview: “there is no more reason to doubt that reason
plays a role in guiding human actions than there is to doubt that reason plays a role in forming human beliefs. In
fact there is less, since people believe much crazier things than they do. And all of [Rosenberg, Pat Churchland, and
Leiter] are dedicated to the project of working out what we have good reason to believe. If they came to the
conclusion that reason doesn’t play much of a role in forming most people’s beliefs most of the time, they
wouldn’t give up that project themselves. They are interested in the kinds of questions that arise when we are
trying to use reason to figure out what to believe. As a moral philosopher, I’m interested in questions that arise
when we are trying to use reason to figure out what to do.”
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For my kind of naturalist, there is no metaphysical difference in kind between moral and
epistemic values—both are artifacts of attitudes common among creatures like us--but that
latter point is still compatible with a radical difference in degree between them. Let us call a
“Global Humean” about epistemic values someone who notices that creatures like us generally
converge in our epistemic attitudes because the norms those attitudes endorse do so well at
meeting widely shared human needs and interests, such as predicting the future course of
experience, as I argued earlier. Consider epistemic norms like the following: treat normal
perceptual experience as prima facie veridical, honor logical inferences, and employ the
inductive method in empirical inquiry. These epistemic norms do, indeed, seem to facilitate
successful navigation of the world and prediction of the future course of experience.
Something like this, I suspect (or hope), was Hume’s own view, though unlike Hume, the other
great modern naturalist Nietzsche does not think natural dispositions converge as well in the
ethical case. That would explain why the great insight Nietzsche attributes to the Sophists
concerns “the multiplicity (the geographical relativity) of the moral value judgments
[Moralischen Werthurtheile]” (The Will to Power, sec 428), not all value judgments, in other
words, but the distinctively moral ones. The key difference in the case of theoretical
normativity is that creatures like us share enough attitudes and interests to allow meaningful
debates about warrant and justification. Global Humeanism in the domain of theoretical norms
gives the appearance of “real” normativity; if the same were true in the practical domain, we
would not get real normativity there, just Global Humeanism about the practical. But, contra
Humean optimism, that is not what we find.
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If we have no real reason to believe the same or act the same, and thus we may not
believe the same or act the same, given that our underlying psychological states (our attitudes)
vary, what follows? What follows is basically what Ayer and Stevenson correctly diagnosed not
quite a century ago: where people share attitudes, reasoning about what one ought to do and
what one ought to believe is possible; where people do not share attitudes, reasoning is not
possible and only force prevails in a dispute, whether that is the rhetorical force of producing a
change in attitudes by whatever means are effective or the physical or lawful force of
suppressing contrary attitudes.11 An agent deciding what to do or what to believe is in the grips
of particular normative attitudes, some practical and some theoretical, and has no reason to
discount them since after all they are her attitudes--although, as Nietzsche noticed, she might
discount them if she were in the grips of a non-naturalistic view of what had to be true of her
attitudes for them to move her, that is, if she thought they had to be something more than her
attitudes. But that I like Japanese food better than Thai food is a fact about my gustatory
attitudes, yet it seems none the worse for that: why wouldn’t I eat Japanese food if that’s my
gustatory attitude? My moral and epistemic attitudes are more ambitious in their scope—for
example, they are not indifferent to your attitudes on similar questions—but they are not, on
the naturalistic view, different from the gustatory attitudes in their metaphysical or
epistemological status. We can easily imagine a world—since such worlds have existed—in
which perceptual evidence is not treated as even defeasibly veridical, in which the so-called
“scientific method” is dismissed, and in which the dominant epistemic values are what the holy
book says or what the holy leader declares. Worlds governed by such epistemic norms tend to
11

If philosophers were more attuned to reality, they would investigate the differing kinds of force
operative in human affairs.
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have features we modern, post-Enlightenment folk find unpleasant, but that is, itself, another
attitudinal response. If enough of our fellows share our attitudes, then darkness recedes, and
Enlightenment triumphs. But those are facts about people’s attitudes, as influenced by their
pleasures and pains, their inclinations and aversions, their loves and hatreds, and not about real
normativity. For naturalists, there is no real normativity, but normative judgment, and its role
in the lives of creatures like us, is easy enough to explain.12
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